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The U.S. Army in Europe has been a pillar of our national defense since the landings on the European continent in June, 1944 . Their first mission was to defeat the powerful military forces of the Axis, then to occupy and help rebuild Europe, and for about forty years they were a key element in deterring Soviet aggression. After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact they have been employed in peace enforcement missions in the Balkans, a war in Afghanistan, two wars in the Persian Gulf, and other humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. The political situation in Europe is now rapidly changing, as is the role of NATO and the character of the U.S. Armed Forces, so it is necessary to rethink what forces the Army should maintain in Europe and how they should be based.
The issue of our future basing in Europe is a little like the old parable of the blind men and the elephant--each one was convinced that the entire elephant was like the part he could feel.
There are complex economic, political, and military considerations which must be taken into account in determining the best basing and deployment policy. It may be difficult to transcend our ingrained mental models as we seek to re-consider our overseas presence.
Peter Senge warns that mental models are "deeply ingrained assumptions, generalizations, or even pictures or images that influence how we understand the world and how we take action." 1 This is no less the case for military leaders than for political leaders. The esteemed British military historian B.H. Liddell Hart commented that "The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out." 2 As we look to determine what type of force structure we will have in Europe, we need to ensure that it is done with an appreciation of where we have come from, how the emerging security environment is
changing, and what it is that we hope to achieve with our forces in Europe. Our forces should then be shaped solely towards current and future objectives.
The Cold War Years
The Cold War Army was developed to meet the strategic objectives of the Truman Doctrine which stated, "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." 3 After victory in World War II, the American forces took on the mission of first enforcing and then building a lasting and constructive peace. Combat units were converted to constabulary service as light cavalry and military police type units. As West Germany began to recover, it also became apparent that a new type of war, The Cold War, would be waged with a capable deterrent and ready force for the defense of Western Europe against Communist aggression.
After West Germany rearmed in 1954, the German Army also played a direct role in the defense of West Germany against the threat of Soviet aggression. Since the primary mission was one of defense against a Soviet led attack, it made more sense to station units in dispersed smaller kasernes that were near their defensive positions that they would man in the event of an attack. These positions were known as the General Defense Plan (GDP)
positions. Training in Europe focused on three tasks, basic gunnery, the speed with which units could get to their GDP positions in the event of an alert, and the exercise of returning forces to West Germany from the United States to assist in the successful defense (known as REFORGER exercises Cold War Army and the U.S. Army in Europe today amounts to a reduction of 70% of soldiers and facilities. 6 In addition, the U.S. Army Europe continues to evolve with the closing of smaller kasernes in preference for moving forces to larger facilities that better support training and combine assets to achieve support efficiencies.
While the Army in Europe is much smaller, it also has significantly different functions than its Cold War predecessor. The Army in Europe today is contingency and security cooperation focused. Specifically, it trains to deploy throughout the region on peacekeeping, peace enforcement or high intensity combat type missions. In the area of security cooperation, the Army in Europe serves as a key driving force for daily security cooperation with our European allies. Among older allies, the purpose of the Army in Europe is to improve interoperability between our forces through combined training and maneuvers.
With our newer allies, our Army is used as a model through "Partnership for Peace" training and exchange opportunities where we help show our newest allies how our Army functions as an institution within a democratic society as well as how we train to preserve the peace. For example, Grafenwoehr has around 2,000 buildings on it and some other "kasernes" only have one. 8 The U.S. Army has continued to close down unneeded facilities and is working to create new basing efficiencies within Germany. The best example of how the U.S. Army
Europe is continuing to evolve its force is through the Efficient Basing East initiative which pulls a Brigade Combat Team of the 1 st Armored Division out of 13 separate kasernes in the Giessen community area (North of Frankfurt) and moves them to the Army's major training facility in Grafenwoehr, Bavaria. 9 This move dramatically increases home station type training and gunnery opportunities for the brigade while cutting costs and time for movement to training areas. While this move creates future readiness efficiencies and annual cost savings (thanks to shutting down inefficient bases), it also costs somewhere in the 450 to 500 million dollar range for the construction of new infrastructure for the unit in Grafenwoehr. 10 The desired end-state of these type of moves is a more efficiently based force that can train more effectively together and that is easier to deploy to operations.
The Rise of the European Union and New Europe
The geo-political situation in Europe has dramatically changed since the end of the Cold The EU is still in the process of developing a security voice and position of its own that may ultimately be expressed outside of the NATO framework if we don't work together to ensure that NATO remains the key security framework for Europe. One of the critical tasks for the United States in the future will be to work with our European allies to ensure that we stay partners for common security and to prevent us from becoming economic and security competitors. The best way to deepen our common security is to deepen our NATO ties and our interoperability through meaningful combined security cooperation efforts and combined operations in the future. NATO's essential and enduring purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has striven since its inception to secure a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. It will continue to do so. The achievement of this aim can be put at risk by crisis and conflict affecting the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance therefore not only ensures the defence of its members but contributes to peace and stability in this region. 13 The emerging area for NATO security was pushed out even farther than the traditional "Euro-Atlantic area" in the wake of the terrorist attacks against the United States of 9/11 and the ensuing Global War on Terror. NATO now supports significant military operations in Afghanistan where NATO has 95 percent of the troops assigned to the International Security and Augmentation Force (ISAF) and is now assuming command of the mission. 14 According to the NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, "This is NATO taking on a multinational operation a continent and a half away from where it was previously restricted by its members." 15 Whatever forces the United States determines to maintain in Europe, their presence should be focused on maintaining the relevance, vitality and interoperability of the NATO Alliance as well as being the basis of a credible American ground force deterrent for the region.
National Strategic Objectives For NATO
One of the unique aspects of serving with NATO is that most officers serve in a national position of the Army of their homeland and a NATO position at the same time. This is nowhere more evident than in the situation of the military commander of NATO. The U.S. • expand NATO's membership to those democratic nations willing and able to share the burden of defending and advancing our common interests;
• ensure that the military forces of NATO nations have appropriate combat contributions to make in coalition warfare;
• develop planning processes to enable those contributions to become effective multinational fighting forces;
• take advantage of the technological opportunities and economies of scale in our defense spending to transform NATO military forces so that they dominate potential aggressors and diminish our vulnerabilities.
• streamline and increase the flexibility of command structures to meet new operational demands and the associated requirements of training, integrating, and experimenting with new force configurations; and
• maintain the ability to work and fight together as allies even as we take the necessary steps to transform and modernize our forces.
The first two and fourth objectives are being pursued primarily through political means.
In fact the U.S. Senate recently voted to support the NATO alliance expansion from its 
The Pros and Cons of Stationing in Germany
As NATO expands, the question of basing in newer member nations versus the legacy bases that we currently occupy must be addressed. Germany has been the main host to our European forces in the past and continues to be to this day. During the Cold War, American units conducted significant training throughout the entire German landscape-since they were training to fight on literally the same ground. Training now is limited to training areas Training areas, such as Grafenwoehr where the majority of live-fire type training is conducted, are limited from training that will exceed noise levels on weekends and German holidays. The use of ranges is carefully coordinated to ensure that all training units plan their ranges during times when it is legal to employ weapons. These type of limitations have a negative impact on training and training officers become very experienced at learning when they can conduct ranges or their units suffer.
The greatest advantages of having forces stationed in Germany are its political central position in the NATO alliance and the European Union which make it a key geographical and political node for access, influence and interoperability. Additionally, the first rate transportation and logistical facilities there are among the best in the world and continue to make Germany a desirable stationing location. Ramstein Airbase is so significant in its capabilities and central position that it has already been labeled as an "enduring" base by In addition to Germany's ideal physical geography, the German government provides extensive support for American basing with both money and personnel support. According to the U.S. Secretary of Defense, the German government offset "21 percent of U.S.
stationing costs" in Germany. 26 After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the German government was forthcoming with significant numbers of military soldiers to secure U.S. facilities in Europe and free up American soldiers for operations in forward deployed areas. General
Meigs compared Germany's support to the sky-rocketing costs that military facilities in the United States were facing and commented that he, "calculated per capita the number of police and military the German government had furnished the United States Army Europe to protect families in Europe. The ratio was over 20 to 1 higher in Germany, and they did not charge us a penny, it was for free." 27 The political access and influence that comes from our personal relationship with the German government through daily presence should not be overlooked. France and Germany both publicly opposed U.S. involvement in the Iraq war, but Germany supported our forces through providing the force protection that General Meigs refers to as well as through its support of peacekeeping in Afghanistan and the Global War on Terrror during this same period. Pulling out of Germany will not have a punishing effect on Germany's support of France as much as it will force Germany to continue to look to French leadership and partnership. According to Dr. Kagan of the U.S. Military Academy, the detrimental effects will not only push Germany into France's sphere of influence, but that "Pulling our permanent bases out of Germany will destroy NATO."
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Intangible Advantages Worthy of Further Study
In studying the issue of forward presence of forces, one encounters surprise at the inherent costs of overseas schools, housing and support for family members overseas. In fact Congressman Duncan Hunter (R-CA), the Chairman of the House Armed Services
Committee recently noted that the, "Cost of doing business in Germany is quite high.
They've got 130 percent of the base cost of living, as reflected in the Washington, D.C.
area." 29 However, there are some other very interesting statistics which seem to indicate that there is an operational advantage to having families forward based with soldiers as well.
According to General Meigs, the recently retired commander of the U.S. Army Europe, the U.S. Army in Europe, "has sustained 40 percent of the deployment activity in the United
States Army with one-sixth of the soldiers." 30 In spite of having to bear such a heavy deployment burden, the initial term and mid-career soldiers in the U.S. Army Europe have continued to reenlist at a rate that is at least twenty five percent higher than their state-side comrades from 1997 to 2001. 31 One of the many reasons that soldiers in Europe sustain a significantly higher deployment burden and yet continue to reenlist at an almost equally significant rate ahead of their state-side peers is because military communities overseas tend to be much more engaged with the life-cycle of the Army units. Military communities overseas are very tightly knit and minister very effectively to each other throughout the hardship of deployment periods. These are intangible differences that have up to now gone un-noticed, but they have a significant impact on the readiness of soldiers and units to deploy and support operations in the EUCOM theater of operations. The linkage of increased capability with the close spiritual and physical connection that overseas families experience with their active duty soldiers is certainly worthy of key investigation. If a slightly increased cost of living for families (offset by the German Government), delivers increased operational capabilities for units along with improved family awareness and wellness, we might be asking why we don't station more of our soldiers forward.
Recommended Ground Forces for Europe
At a minimum, the EUCOM Commander will need to have present command structures to interact with those of our NATO partners. we work to establish interoperability with our NATO partners. Combined exercises that are a common training regimen in NATO become the basis for our capability to function together in operations such as Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan and are vitally important to our security as well as the security of our allies.
Some level of credible forces to support these commanders will be required, but a certain amount of these forces could be "out-sourced" from Army expeditionary units stationed in 
Conclusion
General Gordon R. Sullivan was the Army Chief of Staff when he wrote, "Ultimately, the Army's objective in leveraging change is to create a "learning organization," one that adapts in ever-quicker response cycles, thus creating an institution able to lead, rather than follow, a constantly changing environment." 37 The U.S. Army in Europe is at a key decision point for its future force structure and basing in Europe. Forward presence in Germany is a primary pillar of our relationship with our European allies and is in our, and their, direct national and operational interest, but our combat forces do not need to be based primarily in Germany. Our Army in Europe needs to be based on future security requirements. Since we are no longer defending Germany from cross border aggression, we no longer require a combat heavy force. The military value of presence in Germany in particular and Europe as a whole is to support operations in Eurasia and Africa. The political value is to keep the NATO alliance as a relevant fighting force. The military capabilities required in Europe are to have a force that can effectively train with NATO and that can support forward operations. The future of our relationship with Europe will largely be determined by our success in keeping the NATO alliance relevant and in our continued leadership of the alliance. The EUCOM commander needs to be resourced with an Army in Europe that will optimally support his objectives and his efforts to continue to lead NATO as the SACEUR commander.
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